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Abstract 
We study whether and how contractual arrangements (fixed price vs. time-and-materials 
contracts) change the effect of reputation, certification, and language characteristics on the 
chances of winning outsourcing contracts. Using a comprehensive dataset from an online 
outsourcing marketplace, we model how buyers choose among bidding vendors, and how the 
effects of these variables change under different contract forms.   Our results show that online 
reputation is an important predictor of success only for fixed-price contracts, but not significant 
for times-and-materials contracts. In other words, contract forms can mitigate the typical 
Matthew Effect associated with online reputation systems. Contrary to popular belief, 
certifications do not increase the chances of winning regardless of the contract forms. Linguistic 
features of private communications from the vendor to the buyer also affect the chances of 
winning, and different dimensions have different effects when contract forms change. Our study 
is one of the first to study the interaction between contract formats and different signals that 
vendors can reveal to buyers in the competitive bidding process, and is also one of the first to 
investigate how texts of private communications affect buyers’ contracting decisions.  
 
This version: October 2010 
  
                                                 
1
 The authors thank the NET Institute for their support through the 2010 Summer Research Grant. All 
errors remain our own. Mingfeng Lin (contact author) can be reached at mingfeng@rhsmith.umd.edu; 
Siva Viswanathan, sviswana@rhsmith.umd.edu; Ritu Agarwal, ragarwal@rhsmith.umd.edu.  
Page 2 of 35 
 
Introduction 
 
Recent developments in internet technologies have transformed many industries, and the 
market for labor, even offshore labor, is a vivid example (David H. Autor, 2001). While 
previously only large businesses could outsource (or offshore) software development activities, 
online markets now allow small buyers as well as small software developers to engage in 
transactions and even build long-term relationships. The lower barriers to enter the market now 
allow projects of much smaller sizes to be effectively outsourced online. Meanwhile, despite the 
rapid growth of these markets that bring together atomistic buyers and sellers, the "virtual" and 
"small stake" nature of these markets exacerbates issues of information asymmetry and the 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviors.  Our goal in this paper is to better understand the process 
through which buyers and sellers (workers) are matched in this marketplace, how different 
variables affect buyers' choice, and how these variables function differently under different 
contractual regimes.  
 
Asymmetric information in labor markets can be shown through the ex-ante adverse 
selection problems, worker signaling; as well as ex-post shirking or moral hazard problems. 
When a market like this becomes virtualized, one great advantage is that buyers and sellers of 
labor can engage in transactions that are much smaller in scale, which would not have been 
economically justifiable otherwise. There is a much larger potential for gains from trade in the 
electronic marketplace. Meanwhile, all the information asymmetry described in the last 
paragraph still applies. In fact, buyers and sellers are faced with many additional issues when 
transacting online:  
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(1) Because some jobs are much smaller, employers will have less incentive to conduct extensive 
screening prior to contracting; and if things don't work out, they will have less incentive to 
pursue recourse, seek arbitration, and enforce the contract. Opportunistic behavior could go 
unpunished and may even be encouraged.  
 
(2) The "virtual" nature of the marketplace: employers usually do not know the real identity 
behind the worker's online ID. And, because this is a global marketplace, buyers are unlikely to 
find those outside the US.  
 
To address these issues, almost all online labor markets (such as elance, freelancer or 
oDesk) carry certain functions to improve transaction efficiencies, such as identity verification, 
escrow, arbitration, skill certifications, and reputation systems such as rating. Effectiveness of 
these systems in online labor markets, however, are often assumed rather than tested empirically.  
Systematic studies in this regard will be highly valuable for practitioners.  
 
From a research point of view, a significant number of academic studies have been done 
on reputation systems in online product markets such as eBay. Meanwhile, there have been many 
studies on contract formats, especially in the context of outsourcing. However, there has been 
little confluence between these two streams of literature. Our goal in this paper is to take a first 
step in that direction.  We empirically examine how buyers' choice of vendors is associated with 
characteristics of the vendors at the time of their bids, including their reputation, certification and 
Page 4 of 35 
 
textual communications; and more importantly, how different contract forms change the effect of 
these variables. 
 
The problem addressed in the extant literature is mostly about how buyers decide which 
contract format to use, given that a buyer already knows which vendor to conduct business with. 
Much less is known about how buyers and sellers came into contact in the first place-- the 
process through which the buyer or the seller made the choice of a potential trading partner. One 
reason is that it is very difficult to obtain data on unsuccessful attempts from vendors. Our paper 
attempts to fulfill this gap in the literature by examining variables that affects buyers' choice of 
sellers, especially how their effects differ under different contractual mechanisms -- Fixed Price 
contracts, and Time-and-Materials contracts.  These include: (1) The reputation of the seller 
reflecting his or her prior experience with other trading partners; (2) Third-party certification; 
and (3) Content and sentiment of how the seller communicates with the buyer. While the 
literature has separately documented the significance of variables (1) and (2) in product markets 
and outsourcing, to our knowledge there has been no study so far on how their effects differ 
under different contract mechanisms. More interestingly, not only are we able to capture the 
content of private communications between buyers and sellers, we also have the content of 
communications from other vendors who unsuccessfully attempted to win the contracts. Textual 
analyses of these messages reveal interesting semantic factors that have been largely missing in 
prior studies of contracts and the formation of transactional ties. Furthermore, we have access to 
virtually all information that the buyers have when they choose among the sellers, reducing the 
plausibility of alternative explanations related to variables unobservable to researchers.  
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To summarize, the main research questions that we address in the paper is:  
 
(1) What variables affect a buyer's choice among potential sellers; and  
(2) How do the effects of the following variables change under different contracting mechanisms?  
(a) Reputation mechanism reflecting a vendors' past performance;  
(b) Third-party certification that can potentially serve as a signal; and 
(c) Content and sentiment of how vendors communicate with a potential buyer.    
 
These variables (among others) are identified from our review of the literature on 
reputation systems, contracts, and outsourcing. Our working hypothesis is that, not only should 
these factors play a role in the buyer's decision process; their effects should differ under different 
contractual arrangements. While the choice of contract mechanisms is not new, its interaction 
effects with reputation systems, semantics and certifications are much less investigated.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 situates our study in the broader 
literature in labor, contracts, outsourcing, reputation and certification. Section 3 describes the 
context of our study, followed by a discussion of the data collection and the variables used. 
Section 5 provides the empirical model and results. Implications of the study are in Section 6, 
and Section 7 discusses limitations and future studies related to this paper.  Section 8 concludes.  
 
Literature Review 
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Our paper is situated at the intersection of reputation systems, certification, and contract 
formats, especially in the context of outsourcing. Here we make no attempt to be exhaustive in 
our review of such enormous literature, but rather, we focus on studies that most directly relates 
to our own.  
 
Outsourcing has attracted significant interest in many disciplines, including economics 
and information systems (Christine Koh et al., 2004, Natalia Levina and Jeanne W. Ross, 2003, 
Hüseyin Tanriverdi et al., 2007). Two most popular forms of contracting are Fixed Price (FP) 
Contracts and Time-and-Materials (TM) Contracts. Fixed Price contracts specify a fixed price 
for an outsourcing project, and the vendor will be paid the agreed amount upon satisfactory 
delivery of projects. The risk is on the vendors: if they underestimate the cost of development, 
they cannot charge a higher price later. Time-and-Materials contract, on the other hand, is more 
flexible and shifts the risk to the buyer. Vendors are paid by time and the cost incurred, instead 
of the pre-specified amount.  
 
The distinction between Fixed Price and Time-and-Materials contracts has been subject 
to many theoretical and empirical studies. Gopal, Sivaramakrishnan et al. (2003)investigate the 
determinants of contract choice, and further relate the choice to project outcomes using data from 
vendors located in India. Hasija, Pinker and Shumsky (2008) employ data from an outsourcing 
vendor to investigate the effect of different combinations of contract features. Through content 
analyses of actual contracts, Chen and Bharadwaj (2009) find that contract format has a 
moderating effect on the relationship between contract provisions and transactional 
characteristics. The stylized models of Dey, Fan and Zhang(2010)  suggest that Fixed-Price 
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contracts are better for simple outsourcing projects, while Time-and-Materials contracts are 
better suited for complex ones. These results are echoed in Bajari and Tadelis (2001). These 
results indicate that in our model of vendor selection, project complexity should be accounted for.   
 
A number of studies have also been conducted on the control and enforcement issues in 
outsourcing. For instance, Kirsch (1997) proposes that a portfolio of control modes can be 
adapted to outsourcing. Rustagi, King and Kirsch (2008) study variables that lead to the use of 
formal controls. Meanwhile, one of the classical issues in outsourcing is the hold-up problem 
where the party that makes buyer-specific investments will be at a disadvantage during 
negotiations. Susarla, Subramanyam and Karhade (2010) study IT outsourcing service contracts 
and finds that contract extensiveness could mitigate the hold-up problem, but this is moderated 
by the complexity of tasks.  
 
Reputation is another important subject widely studied in outsourcing. Vendor reputation 
has been linked to contractual performance (Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, 2000, Tracy 
R. Lewis, 1986), since the concern for reputation can potentially "outweigh the temptation to 
renege on a given contract" (Tereza Tykvová, 2007). Jensen and Roy(2008) model the choice a 
trading partner as a two-stage process, in which reputation helps to decide among a bracket of 
alternatives.  
 
While the issue of reputation systems in electronic commerce have been extensively 
studied in the context of product exchanges (such as those on eBay), there has been relatively 
little empirical study of reputation in the outsourcing context. One possible reason is that firms 
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rarely share their outsourcing experience with others, and there is also no central platform for 
them to do so even if they wish. By contrast, online outsourcing markets often extensively use 
such reputation systems to document a vendor's performance, therefore they provide an ideal 
context to study the use of reputation systems in the choice process of outsourcing clients.  
 
One of our working hypotheses is that a vendor's reputation should have a much smaller 
effect on the choice of buyers under Time-and-Materials contracts. A typical issue in the 
traditional Time-and-Materials contract is that the effort level of vendors cannot be easily 
monitored or verified. This restriction has been significantly changed in the online outsourcing 
marketplace because of new technologies that allow buyers to effectively monitor the effort level 
of vendors. As buyers need to approve the billing hours submitted by the vendors, they can 
positively evaluate vendors' efforts if necessary. This makes it possible for them to cautiously 
take some risks and conduct business with vendors who have lesser experience on the 
marketplace, but are able to complete the task at lower costs. If they do turn out to be shirking, 
the buyers will be able to terminate the account instead of having to wait until the deadline under 
a FP contract, thereby reducing the loss.  
 
Another topic that has received significant research is the role of certifications, especially 
those from third-parties. One such study in the context of outsourcing is Gopal and Gao (2009), 
who studied the effect of ISO certification on outsourcing vendors. Similar to ISO certifications, 
the online outsourcing marketplace provides links to a third-party certification website that 
exams the skill set of sellers on different subjects. When vendors pass these exams, an icon will 
be displayed next to their ID and prominently displayed to buyers when the vendor places a bid. 
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However, it should be noted that the threshold of such certification in this market is relatively 
low: Exams are available online, and vendors can take exams multiple times until they pass. 
Hence, the effect of such certification may not be practically significant, especially under pay-
for-time contracts.  
 
We further explore the role of textual communications in the buyers' decision process of 
choosing a vendor, focusing on their differing effects under different contract mechanisms. An 
analysis of language features used by vendors can not only illustrate the decision process of 
buyers, but also be very useful for vendors who attempt to expand their business online. Prior 
empirical studies often do not have information about alternative vendors who failed to secure 
the contract, yet the online market is able to archive all such communications. A study of the 
language used can be especially valuable to outsourcing vendors. Much like entrepreneurs 
pitching their ideas at venture capitalists, these vendors only have a limited opportunity to 
convince a potential buyer. Moreover, it is very likely that some language features are important 
for pay-for-time contracts, while others are more important for pay-for-deliverable contracts.  
We use linguistic analysis software to detect features of the vendors' communications, and 
incorporate them in our econometrical analyses.  
 
Data 
 
In this section we describe major features of the online labor outsourcing marketplace 
where we gathered our data, the "natural experiment" where a new contracting mechanism was 
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introduced, the construction of sample, and the derivation of various variables used in our main 
statistical models.  
 
Context 
 
Data for our study are provided by one of the leading online software outsourcing 
marketplaces. This marketplace is headquartered in the US, but buyers and sellers of the market 
come from all over the world.  
 
(1) Overview  
 
The primary dataset for this research is provided by a leading online software outsourcing market. 
This proprietary dataset contains extensive information about software buyers, vendors, their 
transactions, communications, mutual ratings and other information from October 2001 to 
October 2010 (Our analyses will not use the full sample, however, as we will discuss shortly). 
This is a marketplace of over 250,000 software developers and more than 120,000 software 
buyers from around the world. These are typically small software development projects, mostly 
ranging between $150 and $300. Prior to September 2009, all projects are “fixed-price contracts”: 
coders are paid when they deliver satisfactory products according to buyer requirements.  
 
(2) A Typical Process of Transaction 
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We will first briefly describe a typical process through which buyers and sellers are matched in 
this marketplace.  
 
Buyers and sellers first sign up with an email address. Before they enter any contracts however, 
the website will verify their identity. For instance, US buyers are verified by phone, credit card, 
and driver’s license information. Once the verification is complete, buyers post “request for bids” 
on the site. A typical request includes a title, a summary of requirements, and a rough budget (e.g. 
maximum $500).  
 
Software vendors (sellers) can browse the requests, search for keywords, and they can be notified 
of new projects should they choose to receive such alert emails from the site. When they find a 
project of interest, they can post a bid, which is the amount they will charge for the delivered 
product. Along with the bid, they can (optionally) submit a text message trying to convince the 
buyer that they are a good candidate. This is much similar to the "pitch" that entrepreneurs make 
to venture capitalists when they seek funding. It should be noted that these are sealed bid 
auctions, in the sense that only the buyer can see the bids placed; peer sellers cannot observe 
each other’s bids.  
 
Buyers can communicate with the sellers, and then choose a seller to work with by accepting his 
or her bid. Buyers can choose any bid he or she wants, and lower price bids do not necessarily 
win. This is an important feature of the online labor market that distinguishes itself from 
websites such as eBay.  
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Once the bid is accepted, the buyer will first pay the amount of the bid by credit card or 
electronic check into an escrow account of the site. Then the site sends a notification to the seller 
that they can start working on the project. A contract is thus created.  
 
The buyer and seller communicate with each other through the website to clarify requirements 
and other details. When the seller finishes the project, he or she uploads programs to the site, and 
the buyer can download it to test whether the requirements are met. If so, buyers accept the 
project as 100% complete, and the funds are released from the escrow account to the seller. 
Buyers and sellers can then rate each other on a scale of 1 to 10, and also provide comments on 
each other. These ratings become public information on their profiles, and form the "reputation" 
system on the marketplace. 
 
The website deducts a percentage of fees from the escrowed amount when it is released to the 
vendor. These fees are not only for the provision of an infrastructure and possible arbitrations 
(see next paragraph), but also taking care of paperwork related to taxes and other issues involved 
in paying another person, especially those in a foreign country.  
 
If the project is not completed due to any reason, it typically enters arbitration. The arbitrator is a 
staff member of the site and the arbitration process can be initiated by either the buyer or the 
seller. Arbitrator will review all communications on site, including the original requirements, and 
will contact both parties. Offline communications, if any, are not considered in the process. If 
either party fails to respond, he or she receives a low rating, and loses.  
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(3) A “Natural Experiment”: Emergence of Pay-for-Time Micro Contracts 
 
Up until September of 2009, all projects in this online software outsourcing marketplace are 
“pay-by-deliverables”; that is, the buyer and seller agree on the requirements of the project at the 
beginning, and the cost of the project is fixed. This is comparable to the “fixed price” contracts 
in outsourcing, where the buyer’s obligation is limited a priori and the burden of risks falls on the 
vendors. Since September 2009, the website started to allow buyers and sellers to enter “pay-for-
time” contracts. In this arrangement, sellers are merely paid by the number of hours they work on 
the project without guaranteeing the outcome, and the buyer can terminate the contract at any 
time. If mutually agreed, the contract can extend at the agreed hourly rate. This is made possible 
only because the website created an application to allow the buyers to closely monitor the efforts 
of the sellers. When the seller starts working on a pay-for-time project, they will log into the 
monitoring software, which will take screenshots, random keystrokes as well as webcam pictures 
at given intervals. The buyer can also manually take additional pictures or keystroke recordings 
as required by the contract. These records are kept for the purpose of arbitration: if the buyer 
believes that the coder has inflated the number of hours, the arbitrator can use these recordings as 
evidence.  
 
This change provides an exogenous “shock” to the marketplace that we exploit to study whether 
and how changing contract formats will change the effect of vendor characteristics on their 
chances of winning. 
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(4) Reputation Systems 
 
Much like eBay, the website has developed extensive reputation systems for the vendors so as to 
assist buyer's choice among candidates. When buyers and sellers first sign up, they have no 
ratings. When a project is completely successfully, buyers and sellers can both rate the other 
party. The rating has a numeric part that ranges from 1 to 10 stars, as well as a textual part that 
they can comment on the rating. Information about number of ratings that the seller has received 
up to the time of the bids, as well as the average of those rating, are displayed prominently to the 
buyer when they look at the list of bids received.  
 
(5) Certifications 
 
The website also works with a third party provider who allows vendors to take exams online on 
different subjects. Vendors need to pay about $50 US Dollars to take an exam. If they fail an 
exam, they can wait a few days to re-take it. After they have passed an exam, the website will 
display an "Expert" icon next to their bids. It should be noted that the icon itself does not 
describe the subject of the exams taken, just merely the fact that the vendor has taken at least one 
exam. Buyers need to click through the icon and find out the subject of the exams.  
 
Sample Construction 
 
To understand the factors affecting buyers' choice of vendors, we need to rule out 
alternative explanations. We therefore construct two samples of bid requests that consummated 
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in actual contracts (i.e. buyers matched to a vendor), all bids placed in those auctions, and 
information about buyers, sellers, project descriptions and communications. The first sample 
includes all pay-for-time (c.f. Time and Materials) contracts that were reached between buyers 
and vendors between September 2009 and September 2010. The second sample is a random 
sample of pay-for-deliverables (c.f. Fixed Price) contracts. By conducting analyses on these two 
samples -- both jointly and separately -- we will be able to test whether contract format makes a 
different in the effect of various variables on the probability that a bid is chosen. This however, 
also depends on careful construction of the two samples themselves.  
 
Pay-for-deliverable contracts are the original format used on the website, and it is also 
what most users are accustomed with. Hence, even after pay-for-time contracts are made 
available; many users (buyers and vendors) continue to use pay-for-deliverable contracts. This is 
especially true among buyer-vendor pairs that already have repeated transactions. In our sample, 
almost all pay-for-time contracts in our sample (one year after the implementation of the new 
method) are between dyads that do not previously have engaged in transactions. Hence, for the 
first sub-sample (PFT contracts), we remove the contracts between parties with prior experience 
between them, so that all buyers face comparable degrees of uncertainty when they choose 
among the vendors.  
 
While we have data on bid requests (auctions) that do not have any winning bids at all, 
we decide not to incorporate them in the current analyses. This is because a contract failing to 
consummate may be due to unrealistic requirements of the buyers, instead of any characteristics 
of the vendors. Hence, by focusing on contracts that are actually agreed on, we eliminate the 
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confounding factors from the buyer's side. And as mentioned earlier, we removed contracts 
between buyers and vendors who had prior experience with each other because the degree of 
uncertainty between them is significantly lower.  
 
We now turn to the construction of the second sample - auctions and bids related to Pay-
for-Deliverables (PFD) contracts.  
 
To match the construction of the PFT sample, we first removed PFD auctions that did not 
result in an actual contract for the same reason. We then focus on only the PFD contracts in the 
three months prior to the introduction of PFT contracts (June - August 2009). This is to ensure 
that vendors do not face resource constraints and have to choose between PFD and PFT auctions 
that are posted at the same period of time. For consistency, we also eliminated from this sample 
dyads that had prior experience working with each other. From this reduced dataset, we take a 
random sample of the same number of auctions as the PFT sub-sample described above.  
 
Then, for both PFT and PFD sub-samples, we extracted all bids related to those auctions, 
all comments posted by the vendors in their "first contact" with the potential buyer, information 
about the vendors at the time of their bids, and requirement documentations related to these 
projects. The textual comments were then submitted to two programs for analyses. The first one 
is GNU Aspell
2
 which contains a dictionary of English words. We compare each word contained 
in the vendors' emails, and count the number of typos contained therein: it is possible that more 
typos may reflect difficulty of communication, which could affect the chances that the bids are 
accepted. The second one is LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count), a specialized program 
                                                 
2
 http://aspell.net/ 
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for computational linguistic analyses that generate variables characterizing the texts on a large 
number of dimensions. We go through all these categories and identify the ones that have 
justifiable possible effects on the bids being chosen. These and other variables are explained in 
greater details in the next section.  
 
Derivation of Variables 
 
The level of analysis in our model is each bid: we study how buyer's characteristics and 
their comment's characteristics are associated with the outcome of their bids (winning or losing). 
In this section we describe the construction of the major variables used in our empirical models.  
 
Dependent variable: a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 when a bid is accepted and 
0 otherwise.  
 
Independent variables:  
 
(1) ExpertCertification: Whether or not there is an "Expert Certification" icon next to the 
vendor's bids. As we described earlier, these icons do not directly indicate whether the exams 
that the vendor has taken were on a subject relevant to the current project. However, the icon 
does increase the visibility of a seller, and could potentially create an advantage for them. On the 
other hand, the cost of obtaining the signal is relatively low. Whether or not this is a useful signal 
is an empirical question. In a robustness test, we also included the number of tests that the 
vendor has taken up to the time that the bid was placed.  
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 (2) noRating: An indicator variable that the vendor has no ratings at all.  
 (3) AvgRating: The mean of ratings that the vendor has received up to the time that the bid was 
placed.  
 (4) logRatingsCount: Logarithm of the number of ratings that the vendor received up to the time 
of the bid.  
 (5) BuyerCoderSameCountry: An indicator variable that the buyer and seller are residents of a 
same country.  
(6) BuyerCoderBothUS: An indicator that both parties are from US.  
(7) logCoderMonth: Logarithm of the number of months that the coder has signed up on this 
market. 
(8) logExpertiseLength: Each vendor has a "resume" page where they can post their resumes or 
further describe their experiences and expertise. This variable captures the length of the 
document.  
(9) logBidAmount: Logarithm of the dollar amount of the bid.  
(10) logBidOrder: Logarithm of the order in which the bid was placed. A larger number suggests 
that the bid was placed later. Since the bids are displayed in the order they are received by 
default, earlier bids are more likely to be noticed and accepted.  
(11) noCommentBid: An indicator variable that the bid does not come with a message.  
(12) noTypo: An indicator variable that there is no typo in the comment posted by the vendor.  
(13) ProjectAmtRange: to control for the size of projects, we first calculated the total amount that 
the buyer accepted for each project when he or she chooses a vendor. For pay-for-time contracts, 
this is the hourly rating that the vendor bid, and the estimated number of hours. We then "bin" 
this amount into different intervals: 1 if it's lower than $100, 2 if it's between $100 and $200, 3 if 
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between $200 and $300, 4 if between $300 and $400, and 5 for $400 and above. These are then 
included in the estimation as a series of dummies in a saturated model specification.  
(14) Variables of linguistic features. We use LIWC 2007 to parse bid comments that accompany 
the bids placed by vendors. LIWC is a computational text analysis program developed by 
psychologists James W. Pennebaker and his colleagues. LIWC takes the text files as input, and 
produce numerical characterization of the file by categorizing words and phrases into 
approximately 80 output variables. These include "4 general descriptor categories" such as word 
count, and number of words longer than six letters; "22 standard linguistic dimensions", which 
include percentage of words that are nouns, auxiliary verbs, adverbs and so on; "32 word 
categories tapping psychological constructs" such as affect and cognition; "7 personal concern 
categories" such as home, leisure, work; and 3 "paralinguistic dimensions" such as fillers ("um", 
"you know"); as well as 12 punctuation categories.  
 
Our study is one of the first attempts to apply such analysis to vendors' private 
communications with the buyers in an outsourcing process. We focus on the following variables 
because the other variables either cannot be theoretically justified in our context, or they occur 
very rarely in the sample (such as those representing biological processes). In addition to the 
variables indicate the count of each category of words, we also tested the percentage of these 
words, and obtained similar results. 
 
(a) "We" words including "we", "our", "us" and so on. "We" could refer to the vendor themselves 
- in which case this variable can indicate that the vendor is representing a collective of 
developers; or it can be used to address the buyer as well ("we can start working soon"). Our 
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examination of a sample of bid comments indicates that the previous use is more frequent. But in 
either case, the use of "we" can indicate either the resources of the vendor, or as a subjective way 
of reducing the psychological distance from the buyer. Either rationally or emotionally, this 
category could potentially affect buyers' choice.  
 
(b) Words with more than 6 letters. Long words (which are often jargons as well) can increase 
the difficulty of communication, hence likely to reduce the chances of winning. 
(c) Auxiliary verbs such as "will, am, have".  
(d) Adverbs such as "quickly" "shortly" and "satisfactorily".  
(e) "Time" words such as "time", "end", "until". These words should be a significant predictor in 
Pay-for-Time contracts, although the perception of these words are still subject to the buyer, 
therefore their direction is not immediately clear.  
(f) "Money" words such as "owe" "cash". Note that the bid amount itself is not included in this 
analysis. Hence, "money" words refer to the discussion of money-related issues in the body of 
the text. Discussion of the dollar amount could represent a tradeoff with discussions on the 
requirements of the product, and could negatively affect the chances of winning the bid.  
 
(15) One other linguistic variable that we are interested in studying is the prevalence of typos in 
the comment submitted by vendors. While it is possible that too many typos make it difficult to 
communicate and therefore should make a bid less attractive, it is equally likely that buyers can 
be tolerant of these typos in search of a good deal. We use open-source software GNU Aspell to 
achieve this by submitting these text files (via Perl scripts) to an English dictionary
3
 associated 
with GNU Aspell, and compare each word against the dictionary. The number of typos is 
                                                 
3
 Copyright Kevin Atkinson, http://wordlist.sourceforge.net/  
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recorded for each comment associated with bids. In the estimation, we use logarithm of this 
number. We also calculate the percentage of typo (i.e. number of typos versus total number of 
words in the text) as a candidate variable.  
 
Model 
 
The main goal of our paper is to understand how buyers' choice criteria of potential 
vendors change under different contracting mechanisms. For this purpose, our dataset have some 
very ideal features that allow us to model the buyers' choice. First, since we focus on buyer and 
vendors who do not have prior exchange experiences, hence, all information that leads to a 
buyer's decision is captured in our data. Unobserved factors that may have contributed to these 
choices are minimized, and can be considered orthogonal to our variables of interest. This is 
consistent with the identification strategy in Angrist (1998). Second, unlike prior studies that 
only have information about chosen vendors, we have information about all others who were 
rejected by the buyer. Information about these unsuccessful bidders sheds light on how buyers 
made their decisions. Third, this website uses a sealed auction format; only the buyers see who 
the bidders are, and how much was bid. This ensures that the bids among vendors are 
independent of each other, allowing for proper statistical modeling. 
 
Given these features, we use maximum likelihood estimation of logistic models, where 
the dependent variable is whether or not a bid is placed. Independent variables are virtually all 
the information that buyers were presented with when they decide whom to contract with, as 
described in the previous version. As mentioned earlier, all bids placed in auction are 
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independent of each other because they are sealed. Out of an abundance of caution, we estimated 
the standard errors using clustered sandwich estimators to allow for intragroup correlation, where 
we specify a cluster to be an auction (a request for bid).  
 
Our main hypothesis is that the effect of reputation, certification, and linguistic variables 
change when contract forms change. To test it, we first estimate a logistic model where a dummy 
variable that indicates a Pay-for-Time contract is interacted with the variables of our interest. For 
the overall sample - which includes bids from bidders who have no ratings, no expert 
certifications, or bids that were placed without textual comments - we estimate the following 
model:  
 
0 1 2
3 4
5 6
Prob( 1| ) *
                                  *
                                  
       
BidWins x noRating PFT noRating
ExpertCertified PFT ExpertCertified
noBidComment BuyerCoderSameCountry
  
 
 
   
 
 
7 8
9 10
11
                            + log log
                                   + log log
                                   + 
BidAmout BidOrder
CoderMonths ExpertiseLength
PFT
 
 
 



 
 
In other words, we multiplied the PFT dummy with dichotomous variables that indicate 
no rating bids, no comment bids, and no certification bids - respectively. Results of this model 
are shown in Table 1. We can see that PFT itself is statistically significant, and so is its 
interaction with the no-rating dummy. The other two interactions are however not statistically 
significant. It appears that ratings play a different role under different contract forms, but 
certification and comment dummies are less clear.  
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For the next step, we excluded interaction terms and estimated them separately on the 
PFT contract subsample, and the PFD contract subsample. Results (not reported) are consistent 
with Table 1: dummy variables indicated whether or not there is no comment, and whether or not 
there is no certification, are statistically insignificant for both subsamples. The dummy variable 
for no-Rating, however, show a pattern consistent with our hypothesis: having no ratings 
negatively affects the chances of being selected; this effect is statistically significant at the 1% 
level for PFD or Fixed Price contracts, but only marginally significant for PFT contracts. In 
addition, the magnitude of the effect is also stronger for PFD contracts: placing a bid without a 
rating reduces the odds of winning by over 58% in PFD (cf. Fixed Price) contracts, but by only 
about 30% in PFT (cf. Time and Materials) contracts.  
 
Some auxiliary results are also worth mentioning. We find evidence that on average, 
buyers actually prefer vendors who are from their same country. The tendency to offshore is 
actually less than what mass media would have us believe: The odds ratio of a same-country 
vendor being chosen is actually over 250%. This pattern persists in many more specification that 
we shall discuss, and is robust to the inclusion of variables such as the time zone difference and 
whether English is the official language. In addition, when we replace this variable with a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 when both buyer and vendor are from US, the same result 
obtains. In other words, under comparable degrees of uncertainty (first time interactions), US 
buyers also prefer domestic vendors rather than foreign.  
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Some auction variables are also statistically significant predictors of bidding outcomes: 
bids placed earlier are more likely to be successful, and higher amount of bids are less likely to 
be chosen.  
 
In unreported analyses, we also investigated interaction between some variables. One 
example is between the indicator variable for "no rating" and "number of months since vendor 
signed up". While "no rating" is shown to be negatively associated with the chances of winning, 
it is significantly worse for vendors who are on the market longer. In other words, between two 
vendors who are not rated, the one who joined the site earlier are even less likely to win a 
contract. This is because no-rating suggests that the vendor has not been chosen by any other 
buyer so far. The longer they stay in that situation, the less attractive they become.  
 
The above analyses however, only use dichotomous variables for comment and rating. 
This may be sufficient for Expert Certification (bids either have an "expert" icon next to it, or it 
does not), but it is certainly worth exploring the actual level of rating and the number of ratings. 
In addition, among the bids that do include textual messages, we will investigate how linguistic 
features of these messages affect the choice of buyers.  
 
We first analyze the number of ratings as well as the average rating of vendors when they 
place bids. These variables are displayed prominently to buyers when bids are placed. Replacing 
the dummy variable of "no rating', we include two new variables: (1) logarithm of the number of 
ratings that the vendor has at the time of the bid; and (2) the average of ratings that the vendor 
received at the time of the bid. We report results using subsamples, instead of the overall sample 
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with interaction terms. Results are consistent, although subsample analyses are easier to interpret 
and less dependent on statistical assumptions. In addition, we exclude auctions that choose 
bidders who do not have ratings at the time of the request in this estimation.  
 
Results of the estimation on these two subsamples are reported in Table 2. Variables that 
we have examined previously display very consistent results as before: certification is 
insignificant, while bidding order and bid amount matters. On the other hand, ratings variables 
show some interesting patterns. For instance, while having a large number of ratings in PFD (cf. 
Fixed Price) contracts significantly increases the chances of securing the contract, the effect is 
statistically insignificant in PFT (cf. Time and Materials) contracts. Meanwhile, while the 
average rating has a positive and statistically effect on the chances of winning a contract under 
PFD arrangements, the effect is insignificant for PFT contracts. In fact, the magnitudes of these 
coefficients are also smaller in PFT contracts. All these findings are consistent with our working 
hypotheses.  
 
We now turn to the textual content of comments that accompany bids, and identify 
characteristics that are associated with better chances of winning under different contract formats. 
To this end, we also first limit the estimation sample to auctions that do not choose a bid without 
comments.  
 
The first variable of interest is the number of typos. We studied two alternative metrics 
for typos: total number of typos in the vendor's message, and the ratio of this number to the total 
number of words. While the odds ratio associated with these variables are indeed smaller than 1, 
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they are not statistically significant in all specifications that we described earlier. It thus appears 
that buyers in this market seem to be tolerant of typos, and do not consider them a signal of 
communication difficulties.  
 
The second sets of variables are generated from LIWC. The two main variables that we 
are interested in are "Time" and "Money" variables, as they represent two of the main 
dimensions that buyers consider when they choose a vendor. We find that "time" words are a 
statistically significant predictor of bid success only for pay-for-time contracts, and insignificant 
in pay-for-deliverable (fixed price) contracts. For PFT contracts, a larger number of "time" words 
are associated with higher chances of winning. "Money" words, on the other hand, are also 
significant only for PFT contracts. By contrast and as predicted, a larger number of "Money" 
words are associated with lower chances of winning.  
 
A few other variables also show some interesting patterns. We find that the number of 
words with more than 6 letters is negatively associated with chances of winning, although the 
odds ratio is relatively small in scale. "We" words are not significant predictors in either PFT or 
PFD contracts. Adverbs such as "quickly" increases the chance of winning for PFT contracts 
only, but not for PFD contracts. Auxiliary verbs decrease the chance of winning, although only 
for PFD contracts. Many of these results are robust to specifications. For instance, removing 
Auxiliary verbs do not change the results, especially the other categories of words. Their effects 
seem to be orthogonal to each other.  
 
Discussions and Implications 
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One implication of our study is that Matthew Effects (Robert K. Merton, 1968) can be 
mitigated by changes in contractual forms or other incentive design. Matthew Effect refers to the 
phenomenon that in a competitive environment, individuals, organizations and entities that were 
previous in an advantageous position are very likely to continue their advantage. This is similar 
to the idea of "preferential attachment" (Thomas T. Hills et al., 2009) and other concepts; 
basically, “the rich grows richer, while the poor grows poorer”. For electronic commerce 
websites, such tendency may not be ideal as it is likely to drive away new vendors, yet it is 
indeed happening: Consumers are more likely to buy from sellers with more ratings and higher 
ratings. Our results on the ratings suggest that this effect can be at least mitigated by changes in 
the contract format, at least in the labor and outsourcing markets. Buyers have an incentive to 
hire less known, less experience vendors when the design of the contract allows them to try out 
these vendors, and at the same time allow them to stop paying them if they turn out to be of low-
ability type. This not only has theoretical implications, but also practical: electronic commerce 
websites concerned about expanding customer base can design mechanisms to redistribute the 
risks among buyers and sellers.  
 
The second implication from our findings is that certifications may not always be 
effective. It is possible that this is unique only to this website, and only to the particular types of 
certifications. However, given the popularity of all kinds of certifications and third-parties in 
peer-to-peer markets such as eBay, these results suggest that we should not take certifications' 
effectiveness for granted. While vendors often seek such certifications (at a financial cost), and 
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they do obtain and extra "icon", they unfortunately do not appear to increase vendors' chances of 
obtaining contracts in this market.  
 
Last but not least, our analyses show some potential for automated text analysis. Textual 
analysis is still an emerging field. Our analyses show that buyers do appear to take into account 
what was written by the vendors, and their consideration changes under different contract 
regimes. For platforms such as online outsourcing markets, implementing automatic text 
analyses programs can potentially increase the efficiency of screening vendors, especially as 
when we are able to link textual cues to project outcomes, which we are investigating in a 
separate paper.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Our goal in this paper is not about the choice of contract formats. By constructing two 
non-overlapping subsamples of different contractual forms, we seek to understand how contract 
forms moderate the relationship between a vendor's reputation and their chance of winning a 
contract. A natural extension of this analysis is certainly to go beyond dyads of first-time 
interactions, and understand better the endogenous choice of contractual forms in this context, 
especially between buyers and sellers who have repeated interactions. As described in the paper, 
the proportion of buyer-seller pairs that switched from pay-for-deliverables to pay-for-time 
contracts is very small. It is possible, however, that as users become more familiar with the 
context, we will be able to observe more "switching" of contract forms. At that time, we will be 
able to extend the analyses in this paper to model the contract choice endogenously.  
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A second extension of our study will be incorporating some metrics for the outcome of 
projects. We address the outcome metrics of projects in a separate paper.  
 
Our analysis of the textual comments is one of the first efforts to study the effect of 
written language on buyer choice of vendors. We recognize that there are much more advanced 
text mining techniques available. However, LIWC has been quite broadly used in psychology 
and management, and it is very similar to packages used in finance (P. C. Tetlock et al., 2008), 
General Inquirer. Another valid critique of this analysis is analogous to "Lucas Critiques" in 
economics, in the sense that when vendors realize how buyers respond to their languages, it will 
affect how they write in the future, which in turn will change how buyers screen vendors. These 
are certainly interesting dynamic interactions that can be explored in future research. However it 
does not affect the validity of our current research: these communications are private between 
buyers and vendors. The website has not done analyses like this before, and at least in the time 
frame that we study, no such results were revealed to vendors.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The advancement of information technologies, especially internet technologies, promises 
to change the landscape of labor markets forever (David H. Autor, 2001). How buyers and sellers 
(workers) are matched, how services are delivered, and how efforts are monitored, all these 
dimensions that economists have long studied will be dramatically different in the online market. 
The monitoring technology that we describe in the paper is but one such development. All these 
Page 30 of 35 
 
changes create an abundance of new research arenas. For instance, while researchers have 
extensively investigated contract forms as well as online reputation systems, these two literatures 
rarely cross paths. Our unique dataset allows us to investigate whether and how the effect of 
reputation systems, certifications, and text features change under different contract regimes. 
Given the popularity of reputation, certification and abundance of text in electronic markets, our 
results can have much wider implications beyond this website itself. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Full model with interactions 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with a logistic 
regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow for intra-auction 
correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to interpret for binary 
variables; standard errors in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 1 suggests that a higher value of the 
explanatory variable is positively associated with the probability of winning. Dummies for project amount 
range suppressed for brevity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
Variable Odds Ratio 
ExpertCertified                   1.195 
                                  (0.768) 
noRating                          0.339*** 
                                  (0.093) 
noCommentBid                      0.899 
                                  (0.250) 
BuyerCoderSameCountry             2.036*** 
                                  (0.391) 
logBidAmount                      0.636*** 
                                  (0.038) 
logBidOrder                       0.628*** 
                                  (0.029) 
logCoderMonths                    1.592*** 
                                  (0.132) 
logExpertiseLength                1.038 
                                  (0.043) 
PFT                               2.846*** 
                                  (0.363) 
PFT*Expert                        1.025 
                                  (0.683) 
PFT*Rating                        2.380*** 
                                  (0.793) 
Intercept                             0.116*** 
                                  (0.049) 
N (number of bids)                                5670
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Table 2: Effect of Ratings on PFD and PFT subsamples 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with a logistic 
regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow for intra-auction 
correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to interpret for binary 
variables; standard errors in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 1 suggests that a higher value of the 
explanatory variable is positively associated with the probability of winning. Dummies for project amount 
range suppressed for brevity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
Variable                                  Odds Ratio 
under Pay-for-
Delivery 
Contracts 
Odds Ratio 
under Pay-
for-Time 
Contracts 
ExpertCertified                   1.017 1.170 
                                  (0.651) (0.256) 
logRatingsCount                   1.229*** 1.094 
                                  (0.095) (0.097) 
AvgRating                         1.255* 1.166 
                                  (0.154) (0.117) 
BuyerCoderSameCountry             1.395 3.378*** 
                                  (0.470) (1.103) 
logBidAmount                      0.665*** 0.553*** 
                                  (0.061) (0.058) 
logBidOrder                       0.725*** 0.553*** 
                                  (0.050) (0.052) 
logCoderMonths                    1.616** 1.354** 
                                  (0.341) (0.184) 
logExpertiseLength                1.093 0.975 
                                  (0.068) (0.074) 
Intercept                             0.004*** 0.400 
                                  (0.005) (0.449) 
N (number of bids)                                 2607 974 
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Table 3: Effect of Textual Communications under Pay-for-Deliverable vs. Pay-for-Time Contracts 
Dependent variable is whether a bid was successfully chosen by the buyer. Modeled with a logistic 
regression, with standard errors estimated using clustered sandwich estimators to allow for intra-auction 
correlation. Odds ratio (exponentiated coefficients) reported as they are easier to interpret for binary 
variables; standard errors in parentheses. An odds ratio greater than 1 suggests that a higher value of the 
explanatory variable is positively associated with the probability of winning. Dummies for project amount 
range suppressed for brevity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.001 
 
     Variables                             Odds Ratio Under 
Pay-for-Deliverable 
Contracts 
Odds Ratio Under 
Pay-for-Time 
Contracts 
ExpertCertified                   0.988 1.300 
                                  (0.658) (0.260) 
noRating                          0.450*** 0.708 
                                  (0.126) (0.161) 
BuyerCoderSameCountry             1.861** 2.538*** 
                                  (0.506) (0.811) 
logBidAmount                      0.632*** 0.591*** 
                                  (0.063) (0.062) 
logBidOrder                       0.707*** 0.545*** 
                                  (0.047) (0.042) 
logCoderMonths                    2.152*** 1.340*** 
                                  (0.350) (0.138) 
logExpertiseLength                1.099* 1.033 
                                  (0.060) (0.072) 
Sixltr                            0.969*** 0.987 
                                  (0.011) (0.012) 
we                                0.972 0.994 
                                  (0.027) (0.039) 
auxverb                           0.959*** 0.971 
                                  (0.014) (0.021) 
adverb                            1.022 1.063** 
                                  (0.027) (0.032) 
time                              0.981 1.049** 
                                  (0.017) (0.020) 
money                             1.005 0.897** 
                                  (0.030) (0.049) 
noTypo                            0.745 0.843 
                                  (0.190) (0.230) 
Intercept 0.080*** 1.348 
                                  (0.062) (0.965) 
N (number of bids)                                3653 1490 
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